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§1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-fi ve years, the European Union has developed a far-reaching legal 
regime aimed at countering money laundering. Th e evolution of this regime has been 
linked inextricably with the parallel development of global standards in the fi eld, most 
notably by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). Th is article 
will critically evaluate the content of EU anti-money laundering law, by putting forward 
a comprehensive typology of the EU anti-money laundering regime as outlined in the 
successive EU Anti-Money Laundering Directives (AML Directives)1 and consisting 
of three elements: the criminalization of money laundering and terrorist fi nance; the 
prevention of money laundering via the imposition of a series of duties on the private 
sector; and the focus on fi nancial intelligence, via the establishment and co-operation of 
fi nancial intelligence units responsible for receiving and analysing reports received from 
the private sector.
Th e article will examine the evolution of EU law as regards all elements of anti-money 
laundering law, by focusing in particular on the changes brought forward by the post-
Lisbon Fourth Money Laundering Directive. Th e article will cast light on the infl uence 
of the FATF in shaping these standards and highlight the impact of the ever expanding 
EU anti-money laundering legal framework on fundamental rights and the rule of law.
§2. AN EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORK SHAPED BY 
GLOBALIZATION
In examining the evolution of EU anti-money laundering law, it is essential to bear in 
mind that the development of standards in the fi eld refl ects a remarkable combination 
of global and regional standard-setting eff orts. Th e European Union has been active in a 
number of international fora producing international treaties in the fi eld, most notably in 
the United Nations (the main treaties being the Vienna Convention in 1988, focusing on 
the laundering of the proceeds of drug traffi  cking, and the Convention on Transnational 
1 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10  June 1991 on prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for 
the purpose of money laundering, [1991] OJ L 166/77 (the fi rst AML Directive); Directive 2001/97/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive 
91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering, 
[2001] OJ L 344/76 (the second AML Directive); Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the 
purpose of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing (Text with EEA relevance), [2005] OJ L 309/15 
(the third AML Directive); Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purposes of money laundering 
or terrorist fi nancing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
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Organised Crime, or the Palermo Convention, of 2000) and in the Council of Europe.2 
However, even more central to the development of the EU anti-money laundering legal 
framework has been the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).3
Th e FATF is an ad hoc body, established by the G7 in 1989 under the auspices of 
the OECD.4 Its membership is selective, including OECD states at fi rst and expanding 
since then to include ‘strategically important’ countries and largely to refl ect fi nancial 
globalization.5 When looking at FATF membership today, it is striking that all 15 ‘old’ 
EU Member States, along with the Commission, are now full FATF members. However, 
none of the 12 Member States which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 is a FATF member 
(they are all members of MONEYVAL – the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures, established in 1997 under the auspices of the Council 
of Europe). Th is piecemeal membership means that the Union’s executive, the European 
Commission, can have an infl uence together with certain Member States, in the shaping 
of FATF standards and ensuring compliance with these standards, but that participation 
in regional fora such as the Council of Europe is equally important for the EU in order 
to put forward a further layer of compliance with global standards – with MONEYVAL 
benchmarks are not limited to Council of Europe standards but also include FATF, UN 
and EU anti-money laundering standards.6
Th e main normative output of the FATF has been a series of Recommendations, 
evolving over time and covering a wide range of aspects of the fi ght against money 
laundering. Th e 40 FATF Recommendations produced in 1990 were revised in 1996, 
2003 and 2012, with money laundering counter-measures being deemed necessary to 
counter a series of emerging and new threats, from drug traffi  cking to organized crime 
to terrorism.7 Th e revisions of the FATF Recommendations have gone hand in hand 
2 See V. Mitsilegas, ‘Th e European Union and the Globalisation of Criminal Law’, 12 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies 2009–2010 (2010), p. 337–407.
3 V. Mitsilegas, ‘Global Governance of Crime “Th e European Union and the Global Governance of 
Crime”’, in V. Mitsilegas, P. Alldridge and L. Cheliotis (eds.), Globalisation, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice. Th eoretical, Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Hart, 2015), p. 153–198, whereupon 
this section draws.
4 For a detailed analysis of the role and work of the FATF, see B. Gilmore, Dirty Money: Th e Evolution 
of International Measures to Counter Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (4th edition, 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2011), Ch. 4–6. Gilmore characterizes the FATF as an ‘ad hoc grouping 
of governments and others with a complex but highly focused agenda’, ibid., p. 92.
5 Th e current membership criteria include, along with compliance with FATF standards, 
‘strategic importance’: see FATF, FATF Membership Policy, www.fatf-gafi .org/pages/aboutus/
membersandobservers/fatfmembershippolicy.html.
6 V. Mitsilegas, ‘Regional Organisations and the Suppression of Transnational Crime’, in N. Boister and 
S. Currie (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Transnational Criminal Law (Routledge, 2014), p. 73–89.
7 See V. Mitsilegas, ‘Countering the Chameleon Th reat of Dirty Money: “Hard” and “Soft ” Law in the 
Emergence of a Global Regime against Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance’, in A. Edwards and 
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with the renewal and gradual expansion of the FATF mandate to now include action 
against money laundering, the fi nancing of terrorism and now proliferation.8
Th e rapid evolution and expansion in the FATF mandate, standards and membership 
can be attributed to its informal nature9 and network structure which aims at fl exibility 
and adaptability.10 Although the FATF output takes the form of Recommendations which 
could be characterized as ‘soft  law’,11 their infl uence on the development of EU anti-
money laundering law has been considerable. All EU anti-money laundering directives 
have been justifi ed as necessary to implement FATF Recommendations in the European 
Union legal order.12 Th is strategy has contributed in particular to the extension of the 
scope of the EU anti-money laundering framework. Th e fi rst AML Directive served 
primarily to introduce the preventive framework of the FATF Recommendations into 
EU law.13 Th e second AML Directive was justifi ed by the Commission as necessary to 
implement (and go beyond) the revised FATF Recommendations of 1996.14 Both main 
changes introduced by the Directive (namely the extension of the money laundering 
predicate off ences and the extension of preventive duties to non-fi nancial professions) 
were justifi ed by reference to FATF fi ndings and requirements: the Preamble to the 
Directive stated that there has been a trend in recent years towards a much wider 
defi nition of money laundering based on a broader range of predicate underlying 
off ences, as refl ected for example in the 1996 revision of the 40 Recommendations of the 
Financial Action Task Force, the leading international body devoted to the fi ght against 
money laundering.15
8 Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012–2020), Washington DC, 20 April 2012.
9 On the concept of informal international law-making see J. Pauwelyn, R. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds.), 
Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press, 2012); Informal law-making is defi ned 
as dispensing with certain formalities traditionally linked to international law having to do with 
output, process, or the actors involved, see J. Pauwelyn, ‘Informal International Lawmaking: Framing 
the Concept and Research Questions’, in J. Pauwelyn, R. Wessels and J. Wouters (eds.), Informal 
International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 13–34, 15.
10 On the network nature of the FATF see A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University 
Press, 2004). Slaughter highlights the advantages of what she calls ‘government networks’, marrying 
hard and soft  power and using information, persuasion and socialization, see ibid., p. 168 et seq.
11 In the context of the FATF, it can be argued that the regular revision of both mandate and standards 
has been easier compared to a more formal international organization. See in this context A. Boyle, 
‘Some Refl ections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft  Law’, 48 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (1999), p. 901, 903, noting that soft  law instruments are easier to amend or replace than treaties.
12 See V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: A New Paradigm of 
Security Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles (Kluwer Law International, 2003); and V. 
Mitsilegas and B. Gilmore, ‘Th e EU legislative framework against money laundering and terrorist 
fi nance: A critical analysis in the light of evolving global standards’, 56 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (2007), p. 119–141.
13 V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union.
14 Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directive 
91/308/EEC of 10  June 1991 on prevention of the use of fi nancial system for the purpose of money 
laundering, COM(1999) 352 fi nal, p 3.
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Th e Commission also accepted that there is a trend towards the increased use by money 
launderers of non-fi nancial businesses as confi rmed by the work of the FATF on money 
laundering techniques and typologies.16 On the basis of these fi ndings, the second AML 
Directive extended the list of predicate off ences and the list of professions to be covered 
by the Directive obligations, to include inter alia lawyers.17 Th e third Money Laundering 
Directive, adopted in 2005, extended the scope of the legislation to cover the fi ght against 
terrorist fi nance, a key political priority post-9/11, and updated existing legislation in 
the light of international regulatory developments in the fi eld, most notably regarding 
customer identifi cation.18 Th e Directive presented a major overhaul of the provisions on 
prevention – in particular those provisions on customer identifi cation – in the light of 
the revised FATF Recommendations in the fi eld, introducing a number of FATF-inspired 
concepts such as the so-called ‘risk-based approach’ to customer identifi cation and more 
detailed provisions on benefi cial ownership and ‘politically exposed persons’.19
Ensuring compliance with the FATF Recommendations has also been the driver 
for the negotiation and adoption of the fourth AML Directive: Th e Commission’s 
Explanatory Note to its proposal for the fourth AML Directive argues that ‘a revision 
of the Directive at this time is complementary to the revised FATF Recommendations, 
which in themselves represent a substantial strengthening of the anti-money laundering 
and combating terrorist fi nancing framework’.20 Th e need to align EU law to the revised 
FATF Recommendations is also refl ected in the Preamble to the fourth AML Directive. 
Recital 4 states that:
Money laundering and terrorist fi nancing are frequently carried out in an international 
context. Measures adopted solely at national or even at Union level, without taking into 
account international coordination and cooperation, would have very limited eff ect. Th e 
measures adopted by the Union in that fi eld should therefore be compatible with, and at 
least as stringent as, other actions undertaken in international fora. Union action should 
continue to take particular account of the FATF Recommendations and instruments of other 
international bodies active in the fi ght against money laundering and terrorist fi nancing. With 
a view to reinforcing the effi  cacy of the fi ght against money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, 
the relevant Union legal acts should, where appropriate, be aligned with the International 
Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation 
adopted by the FATF in February 2012 (the ‘revised FATF Recommendations’).
16 Ibid., Recital 14.
17 Human rights concerns with regard to fair trial rights by the European Parliament have led to 
negotiations on the Directive being extended to the Conciliation stage – agreement was reached aft er 
the Directive was packaged as an emergency counter-terrorism measure in the weeks aft er 9/11. For an 
overview, see V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-measures in the European Union.
18 See Recital 5 of Directive 2005/60/EC for reference to the revision of the FATF Recommendations.
19 For further details and an overview of the third Money Laundering Directive, see V. Mitsilegas and B. 
Gilmore, 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2007).
20 Commission Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the 
purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing, COM(2013) 45 fi nal, p. 3.
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Th e infl uence of the FATF on the shaping of EU law is also evident in the Commission’s 
impact assessment accompanying the proposal for the fourth AML Directive, according 
to which one of the key ‘problem drivers’ is that the existing EU rules are inconsistent 
with the recently revised international anti-money laundering standards and explains 
that there is a strong incentive on jurisdictions to correct inconsistencies with the 
international standards. Full compliance can send an important reputational signal 
which is vital for countries seeking to attract foreign investment. On the other hand 
non-compliance is subject to an attentive follow-up process by the FATF. Persistent non-
compliance can lead to inclusion in one of the FATF’s Public Statements on political and 
reputational damage.21
Th e infl uence of FATF standards on the development of EU anti-money laundering 
law raises a number of rule of law concerns. FATF standards have been developed 
by a single-agenda ad hoc body with selective membership and a minimum level of 
transparency and accountability in its operations.22 Th e operation of the FATF in these 
terms serves to depoliticize the discussion on the need for new anti-money laundering 
measures which increasingly strengthen the arm of the state and to produce an expert 
orthodoxy in terms of both money laundering typologies and the necessary measures to 
counter the phenomenon.23 Th e need for the extension and renewal of both the FATF 
and its Recommendations has been constantly been accepted as a given,24 and each 
21 Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the 
use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the 
proposal for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, SWD(2013) 21 fi nal, p. 18.
22 For a general analysis of the transparency and accountability defi cit, relevant also in the context of 
the FATF, see J. Cohen and C.F. Sabel, ‘Global Democracy?’, 37 NYU Journal of International Law 
and Policy (2004–2005), p. 763. Th ey note that ‘to a substantial and growing extent, then, rulemaking 
directly aff ecting the freedom of action of individuals, fi rms, and nation states (and the making of the 
rules to regulate this rulemaking) is taking place, undemocratically but not entirely unaccountably, in 
global settings created by the world’s nations but no longer under their eff ective control’ (ibid., p. 764).
23 On various aspects of the ‘depoliticisation’ in the development of global standards, see: A. Somek, 
‘Administration without Sovereignty’, University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper 09–04 (2009), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333282, p.  17 (noting that ‘where “problem-
solving” serves as the preferred descriptor of an activity, ideological confl ict does not enter the picture. 
Problem-solving is the antithesis of political struggle’); J. Klabbers, ‘Institutional Ambivalence by 
Design: Soft  Organizations in International Law’, 70 Nordic Journal of International Law (2001), p. 403, 
(noting that ‘the facility of doing business without being side-tracked or controlled, dovetails neatly with 
our late-modern (or postmodern) infatuation for management and technocracy as viable substitutes for 
politics’); and D. Kennedy, ‘Challenging Expert Rule: Th e Politics of Global Governance’, 27 Sydney 
Law Review (2005), p. 5 (talking inter alia about ‘the expert consensus’). For a more positive view, see 
A.M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 54. Slaughter views the FATF 
typologies as ‘important opportunities for operational experts to identify and describe current money 
laundering trends and eff ective countermeasures’ and stresses the benefi ts of professional socialization. 
Slaughter promotes the advantages of what she calls ‘government networks’, marrying hard and soft  
power and using information, persuasion and socialization (ibid., p. 168 et seq.).
24 Kennedy notes in this context that progress narratives become policy programs, ‘both by solidifying 
a professional consensus and by defi ning what counts as progress for the international governance 
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production or revision of the FATF Recommendations has been mostly adopted without 
criticism by the European Commission in its proposals for Union law in the fi eld and 
subsequently by Member States in the Council and by the European Parliament as co-
legislators. In this manner, a specifi c agenda developed by technocrats and with limited 
scrutiny at the global level has been legitimized, via the EU decision-making process, 
and adopted at the Union level to bind both FATF and non-FATF members.
§3. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
A key component of the EU’s anti-money laundering strategy has been in line with global 
developments in the fi eld – the creation of a series of new money laundering off ences. 
Th e fi rst AML Directive introduced in the EU legal order gives a defi nition of money 
laundering largely following the standard wording of the 1988 Vienna Convention 
on drug traffi  cking.25 Th e defi nition of the main elements of money laundering has 
remained the same since. What has evolved over time has been the extension – again in 
line with global developments in the fi eld – of the money laundering predicate off ences, 
namely the crimes which are deemed to generate proceeds for the purposes of EU anti-
money laundering law. Th e extension of the list of predicate off ences mirrors the analysis 
of money laundering as a chameleon threat evolving over time.26
Indeed, in line with FATF policy,27 EU law has moved from the prohibition of 
money laundering of the proceeds of drug traffi  cking (to address the priorities of the 
so-called ‘war on drugs’ in the late 1980s and early 1990s) to move in subsequent decades 
towards the prohibition of the laundering of the proceeds of organized and serious 
crime (to address the threat of organized crime), and, post-9/11, and notwithstanding 
the substantial diff erences between the two off ences,28 to add terrorist fi nance to the 
EU money laundering prohibition regime.29 As will be seen below, the fourth AML 
Directive adds to the proliferation of this list by expressly requiring Member States to treat 
tax off ences as predicate off ences. Th is expansive approach raises a number of questions 
regarding the observance of the principle of legality at EU level and the extent to which 
legislative and policy choices in the fi elds may lead to uncritical over-criminalization.30
25 V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-measures in the European Union, Ch. 3 and 4.
26 V. Mitsilegas, in A. Edwards and P. Gill (eds.), Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global 
Security, p. 195–211.
27 See FATF Recommendations 3 and 5.
28 Th e main diff erences between money laundering and terrorist fi nance involve: the sums involved; the 
fact that money laundering refers to crimes already committed whereas terrorist fi nance is forward 
looking; and the fact that, unlike money laundering, terrorist fi nance may not involve proceeds of 
crime (on the latter point see V. Mitsilegas, in A. Edwards and P. Gill (eds.), Transnational Organised 
Crime: Perspectives on Global Security).
29 V. Mitsilegas and B. Gilmore, 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2007), p. 119–141.
30 On the concept of overcriminalization see D. Husak, Overcriminalization. Th e Limits of the Criminal 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2007).
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A. THE EUROPEAN LEGALITY DIMENSION
A key rule of law question in the adoption of EU money laundering law has been the 
choice of legal basis. Legal basis questions emerged at the time of the negotiations of the 
fi rst AML Directive. Th is was in 1990, before the Maastricht Treaty, which conferred for 
the fi rst time upon the European Union the express competence to legislate in criminal 
matters, entered into force. Arguably money laundering legislation is predominantly of a 
criminal law nature and the primary objective is to combat crime: fi nding a legal basis in 
the pre-Maastricht EC Treaty raised legality concerns in view of the limits of Community 
competence to adopt legislation on criminal off ences and sanctions. Th e solution 
reached was to adopt the fi rst AML Directive under a dual free movement/internal 
market legal basis under the justifi cation that preventing money laundering was essential 
to ensure the integrity of the Community fi nancial system and the internal market.31 
Th is solution was combined with a choice of wording in the fi rst AML Directive which 
obliged Member States to prohibit (rather than criminalize) money laundering.
In practice, all Member States treated the money laundering conduct defi ned in 
the fi rst AML Directive within their criminal law, establishing new money laundering 
off ences. Notwithstanding the express conferral upon the European Union of competence 
to defi ne criminal off ences and impose criminal sanctions aft er the Maastricht Treaty 
under the third pillar and the rulings of the Court of Justice in the cases on environmental 
crime and ship-source pollution which paved the way for criminalization under the 
former fi rst pillar,32 the Union legislator continued to use the internal market legal basis 
of the fi rst AML Directive in the adoption of the second and third AML Directives, both 
adopted aft er the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty.33 Th e post-Lisbon fourth 
AML Directive is no exception. It has been adopted under the internal market legal basis 
of Article 114 TFEU, with the text of the fourth AML Directive continuing to state that 
money laundering (and terrorist fi nance) must be prohibited (and not criminalized).34
Th is choice is all the more striking in view of the abolition of the third pillar and the 
introduction of an express ‘functional criminalisation’ EU competence in Article 83(2) 
TFEU, under which the Union has the power to adopt legislation defi ning criminal 
off ences and imposing criminal sanctions when such measures are essential to ensure 
the eff ective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to 
31 Articles  57(2) and 100(A) EC, now Articles  47(2) and 95 TFEU respectively. For an analysis of 
negotiations and outcome, see V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-measures in the EU, p. 56–63.
32 Case C-176/03 Commission v. Council, EU:C:2005:542 ( the environmental crime ruling); and Case 
C-440/05 Commission v. Council, EU:C:2007:625 ( the ship-source pollution ruling). For an analysis 
see V. Mitsilegas, ‘Th e Transformation of Criminal Law in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 
26 Yearbook of European Law 2007 (2007), p. 1–32.
33 V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-Measures. V. Mitsilegas and B. Gilmore, 56 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2007).
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harmonization measures.35 Th e choice of the Union legislator to disregard the express 
criminal law legal basis of Article 83(2) TFEU and base the fourth AML Directive solely 
on Article 114 TFEU is also at odds with a number of other EU criminal law measures with 
a fi nancial law dimension post-Lisbon. One example has been post-Lisbon secondary law 
on market abuse, where two parallel instruments – one on administrative and one on 
criminal law – have been adopted.36
Another example has been the proposed directive on criminalizing fraud against the 
Union budget. Whereas the European Commission has opted in favour of exclusively 
using Article 325 TFEU as a legal basis37 in negotiations in the Council Member States 
have opted for the use of Article 83(2) TFEU as the sole legal basis for this instrument.38 
Th e choice to use or not to use Article  83(2) TFEU is not merely symbolic. Using 
Article 83(2) TFEU has constitutional implications including the granting to Member 
States of the possibility of triggering an emergency brake in negotiations, the non-
participation of Denmark in the adoption of the instrument and the possibility of an 
opt-out for the United Kingdom and Ireland.39 Th e use of Article 114 TFEU as the sole 
legal basis for the fourth AML Directive ensures maximum participation by EU Member 
States in its provisions.
B. THE EXPANSION OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING PREDICATE 
OFFENCES
As mentioned above, the evolution of EU anti-money laundering law has been 
characterized by a constant extension of the list of money laundering predicate off ences. 
Article 3(4) of the fourth AML Directive includes as predicate off ences terrorism, drug 
traffi  cking, organized crime, fraud, corruption and all off ences which are punishable 
35 V. Mitsilegas, ‘EU Criminal Law Competence Aft er Lisbon: From Securitised to Functional 
Criminalisation’, in D. Acosta and C. Murphy (eds.), EU Security and Justice Law (Hart, 2014), p. 110–
129.
36 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market 
abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, [2014] OJ L 
173/1; and Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive), [2014] OJ L 173/179.
37 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fi ght 
against fraud to the Union’s fi nancial interests by means of criminal law, COM(2012) 363 fi nal.
38 See Council document 8604/15, Brussels, 7 May 2015, from www.statewatch.org/news/2015/may/eu-
council-fraud-dir-trilogue-8604–15.pdf.
39 Indeed, the United Kingdom has raised the issue of Article 83(2) TFEU being included in the legal bases 
of the proposal, but has not objected to the content or its participation in the Fourth Money Laundering 
Directive, see House of Lords European Union Committee, Th e UK’s opt-in Protocol: implications of 
the Government’s approach, 9th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 136. On the ‘intergovernmental’ 
elements of Article 83 TFEU see V. Mitsilegas, ‘From Overcriminalisation to Decriminalisation. Th e 
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by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year 
or, as regards Member States that have a minimum threshold for off ences in their legal 
system, all off ences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a 
minimum of more than six months. It is clear thus that the EU has moved to a model of 
the criminalization of money laundering on an all-crimes basis. Some of the predicate 
off ences are defi ned by reference to European Union (terrorism, organized crime, fraud) 
or United Nations (drug traffi  cking) criminal law measures in the fi eld. Others however 
(including corruption, notwithstanding the existence of both EU and international 
law norms in the fi eld) and other off ences falling within the generic penalty threshold 
defi nition in Article  3(4)(f) of the fourth AML Directive, however, are not defi ned 
by reference to other EU law or international instruments and many of them remain 
unharmonized at EU level. Th is choice poses signifi cant challenges to legal certainty, in 
particular in the operation of EU mutual recognition measures such as the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, where mutual recognition of judgments 
related to money laundering must take place without the requirement for executing 
authorities to verify the existence of dual criminality.40
Th e fourth AML Directive has continued the trend towards the extension of the 
money laundering predicate off ences by expressly including in this list tax off ences – 
defi ned as tax crimes relating to direct taxes and indirect taxes.41 Th is addition raises 
concerns, particularly since no harmonization of the defi nitions of tax crimes has taken 
place at EU level and, as indicated in the Commission proposal for the fourth AML 
Directive, there was no intention to do so.42 As a result, diff erent tax off ences may be 
designated at the national level, potentially aff ecting the implementation of other rules 
of the fourth AML Directive.
In its Impact Assessment, the Commission had contended that designing detailed 
rules for the circumstances in which the off ence is committed would be the optimal 
option, as it would ensure coherence across the EU, send a clear signal with respect to 
tax crimes and ensure the effi  ciency of cooperation.43 However, it pointed out that it 
would ‘entail substantial delays due to political diffi  culties in agreeing a common list of 
types of tax evasion’,44 thus delaying an overall agreement. Th erefore, the Commission 
opted for an approach whereby the existing threshold applied in serious crimes would 
40 Article 2(2) of 2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States – Statements made by certain Member 
States on the adoption of the Framework Decision (European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision), 
[2002] OJ L 190/1.
41 Article 3(4)(f) of the fourth AML Directive.
42 See the Commission Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the 
purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing, COM(2013) 45 fi nal, p. 14.
43 Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the 
use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the 
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be used without the adoption of a precise defi nition. Th e Parliament favoured a diff erent 
approach by noting that ‘agreeing on a defi nition of tax crimes is an important step in 
detecting those crimes’, without however, providing any suggestions on such a common 
defi nition.45
In the light of these concerns, the Council proposed to include in Recital 11 of the 
fourth AML Directive a reference pointing out the diff erent defi nitions of tax off ences 
at the national level and noting that ‘while no harmonisation of the defi nitions of tax 
crimes (…) is sought, Member States, should allow, to the greatest extent possible under 
their national law, the exchange of information or the provision of assistance between 
EU Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)’.46 Th e express insertion of tax off ences within 
the Union’s anti-money laundering framework may lead to a catch-all, undiff erentiated 
crime control strategy which fails to distinguish between the distinct features and 
rationale behind the criminal and regulatory response to tax off ences on the one hand 
and serious and organized crime on the other. As in the case of the introduction of 
terrorist fi nance within the Union’s anti-money laundering framework, this approach 
may prove to be ineff ective by utilizing anti-money laundering tools for tackling a very 
distinct phenomenon. From a criminal law perspective, this development may have 
seriously adverse labelling implications.47 Th e catch-all approach of the fourth AML 
Directive – which seems to have adopted a purely functionalist model of criminalization 
by inserting tax predicates in order to ensure maximum intelligence sharing – would 
thus undermine key principles of criminal law.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In addition to the prohibition of money laundering as such, EU anti-money laundering 
law has introduced sanctions for non-compliance with the money laundering preventive 
duties imposed by the AML Directives upon the private sector. Th e AML Directives leave 
considerable discretion to Member States regarding the types and levels of sanctions they 
can use, something which is confi rmed also by the fourth AML Directive.48 However, 
the fourth AML Directive goes a step further than its previous incarnations. Article 59 
45 Council of the European Union, Document 7387/14, 13.3.2014, p. 11.
46 As already agreed in Council of the European Union, Document 9752/1/12, 26.5.2014, p. 5.
47 According to Alldridge and Mumford, diff erentiation of tax evasion from other acquisitive crimes is 
important for the purposes of the labelling function of criminal law. If all acquisitive crime is redesigned 
as tax evasion, then the ability of the criminal law to diff erentiate when labelling is diminished, see P. 
Alldridge and A. Mumford, ‘Tax Evasion and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002’, 25 Legal Studies (2005), 
p. 353–373, 372–373.
48 According to Article 58(1) of the fourth AML Directive, Member States must ensure that obliged entities 
can be held liable for breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive in accordance with this 
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of the fourth AML Directive stipulates that in certain cases sanctions must be applied. 
In particular, cases of serious, repetitive, systematic breaches or a combination of these 
concerning customer due diligence, suspicious transaction reporting, record-keeping or 
internal controls must be subject to sanctions. Th e EU legislator went a step further by 
including a list of minimum penalties for such cases: a public statement;49 an order 
requiring the specifi c conduct to stop; withdrawal or suspension of authorization (where 
appropriate); a temporary ban from exercising managerial functions in obliged entities; 
and a maximum administrative pecuniary sanction of at least twice the amount of the 
benefi t derived from the breach or at least € 1,000,000. For breaches concerning a credit 
institution or fi nancial institution, the maximum pecuniary penalties for a legal person 
are at least € 5 million or 10% of the total annual turnover, and at least € 5 million for a 
natural person. Finally, the requirement that Member States produce statistical data is 
reinforced and refi ned by enlisting types of data that need to be compiled at the national 
level.50
A key question with broader policy and constitutional implications concerns the 
relationship between criminal and administrative sanctions in this fi eld. Article 58(2) 
of the fourth AML Directive states that national rules on administrative sanctions 
implementing the fourth AML Directive will be without prejudice to the right of Member 
States to provide for and impose criminal sanctions, adding that Member States may 
decide not to lay down rules for administrative sanctions or measures for breaches which 
are subject to criminal sanctions in their national law.
However, it is questionable whether this lack of harmonization contributes 
towards the eff ectiveness of EU law in the fi eld. If the choice of the EU legislator has 
been to treat non-compliance with the preventive duties set out in the fourth AML 
Directive by administrative sanctions, then the choices of Member States to ‘goldplate’ 
implementation by imposing criminal sanctions should be limited by the requirement to 
ensure the eff ectiveness of EU law. Eff ectiveness in this context is not necessarily linked to 
criminalization, and, as with other post-Lisbon cases (including in particular the market 
abuse legislation), eff ectiveness of EU law may actually lead to de-criminalization, rather 
than over-criminalization.51
49 Th e EDPS has highlighted that the publication of sanctions is not in line with necessity and 
proportionality rules and is not coupled with adequate safeguards for the rights of the individuals 
in question. See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on a proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial 
system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, and a proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on information on the payer accompanying transfers 
of funds, 4.7.2013, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/
Consultation/Opinions/2013/13–07–04_Money_laundering_EN.pdf, p. 12–13.
50 Article 44 of the fourth AML Directive.
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§4. THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
Th e imposition of a series of preventive duties upon the private sector constitutes the 
cornerstone of any anti-money laundering regime. Th e co-opting of the private sector 
by the state in the fi ght against money laundering is a key example of what David 
Garland has called the responsibilization strategy.52 In the case of money laundering, 
this strategy has been promoted by the FATF, and implemented in detail by the EU. 
Key duties of the private sector in this context constitute customer identifi cation, record 
keeping, reporting of suspicious transactions and the duty not to ‘tip off ’ customers or 
other relevant persons in money laundering investigations.53
Th e imposition of preventive duties on the private sector has evolved over time in two 
respects. Firstly, the revision of FATF Recommendations and subsequent amendments 
of the EU AML Directives have expanded the scope of the professions which are subject 
to anti-money laundering preventive duties, from banks and fi nancial institutions 
initially to other regulated professions such as lawyers and accountants, to less regulated 
sectors including ‘other persons trading in goods to the extent that payments are made 
or received in cash in an amount of EUR 10 000 or more, whether the transaction is 
carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked’.54 
Th e extension of anti-money laundering preventive duties to less regulated sectors raises 
serious questions of the feasibility of compliance and eff ectiveness of prevention in 
sectors of limited regulation and resources.
Th e extension of the list of professions covered by money laundering legislation 
has created controversy in particular regarding the imposition of preventive duties to 
lawyers, with the latter arguing that these duties are contrary to the relationship of trust 
between lawyer and client and challenge the rights of fair trial and protection of private 
and family life.
Since the adoption of the second AML Directive, there have been attempts to balance 
confl icting interests by covering notaries and independent legal professionals primarily 
in the context of fi nancial transactions.55 EU law exempts them from the second AML 
Directive’s duties when they ascertain the legal position of their clients or they represent 
their clients in legal proceedings.56 It has also done so by allowing Member States to 
designate an appropriate self-regulatory body other than the FIU to receive suspicious 
transaction reports.
52 D. Garland, ‘Th e Limits of the Sovereign State’, 36 British Journal of Criminology (1996), p. 445–471.
53 V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-measures, Ch. 5.
54 Article 2(1)(e) of the fourth AML Directive. See also a further extension provided by Article 4(1) of 
fourth AML Directive on the risk-based approach.
55 See Article 1(3)(b) of the fourth AML Directive.
56 See Article 34(2) of the fourth AML Directive.
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Both the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have ruled that 
such EU law57 complies with the right to fair trial58 and the right to privacy59 respectively. 
It is noteworthy in this context that the European Court of Human Rights has in eff ect 
legitimized the role of the FATF in developing anti-money laundering standards and 
in assessing Member States’ anti-money laundering performance.60 Th e Court noted 
in particular in response to the claimant’s argument that the imposition of duties on 
lawyers was ineff ective that this was not the case since the FATF found that France’s 
methods of combating money laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism were among the 
most eff ective in the world.61
Th e second feature in the development of anti-money laundering preventive duties 
has been the elaboration in greater detail and sophistication of the content of these duties. 
Two seemingly confl icting trends can be discerned in this context. On the one hand, the 
categories of individuals and companies to be monitored under know-your-customer 
and due diligence requirements have proliferated, to include expressly and in greater 
detail, as will be seen below, benefi cial owners and politically exposed persons. On the 
other hand, a prescriptive approach focusing on routine compliance with preventive 
duties – including for example the routine reporting of suspicious transactions if they 
exceed a certain threshold – has been replaced by the adoption of a so-called ‘risk-based 
approach’ to compliance.62
Th e adoption of a ‘risk-based approach’ can be seen as an attempt to move from 
mechanical compliance to a system where the quality of compliance – and in particular 
customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reports – is enhanced. As has 
been noted, in the risk-based approach, cooperation becomes active and dynamic as 
professionals must design an anti-money laundering model which is suited to make the 
use of fi nancial structures and networks more diffi  cult for money launderers.63 While 
it remains to be seen whether the ‘risk-based approach’ will lead to a more eff ective 
anti-money laundering framework, it must be noted that by granting a greater degree 
of discretion to the private sector, it may create a greater degree of legal uncertainty 
for those called upon to comply with the preventive anti-money laundering duties. Th e 
extent to which the adoption of a risk-based approach would constitute a defence or 
exonerate the private sector from administrative or criminal liability for alleged non-
57 See for the latest version Article 34(1) of the fourth AML Directive.
58 Case C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, EU:C:2007:383.
59 Case of ECtHR, Michaud v. France, Judgment of 6 December 2012, Application No. 12323/11.
60 Ibid., para.123 and 125.
61 Ibid., para. 125.
62 On the risk-based approach, see M. Bergström, K. Svedberg Helgesson and U. Mörth, ‘A New Role for 
For-Profi t Actors? Th e Case of Anti-Money Laundering and Risk Management’, 49 Journal of Common 
Market Studies (2011), p. 1043–1064.
63 L. Dalla Pellegrina and D. Masciandro, ‘Th e Risk-Based Approach in the New European Anti-Money 
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compliance with preventive anti-money laundering duties is not particularly clear. Th e 
fourth AML Directive has further developed both these trends (on the extension of the 
web of monitoring while at the same time employing a risk-based approach) and the 
main new features will be examined below.
A. THE EXTENSION OF PREVENTIVE DUTIES RATIONE PERSONAE
Th e fi rst extension of the scope of the fourth AML Directive involves the gambling 
industry. According to Article 2(1)(f) of the fourth AML Directive, the requirement for 
applying customer due diligence is extended to the whole gambling sector, and no longer 
to casinos only as was the case since the second AML Directive.64 However, following 
an appropriate risk assessment, Member States may decide to exempt in full or in part 
providers of certain gambling services from the rules on the basis of a proven low risk 
posed by the nature and, where appropriate, the scale of operations of such services. 
Among the factors for such a risk assessment, Member States must consider the degree of 
vulnerability of the applicable transactions. Furthermore, any decision must be notifi ed 
to the Commission together with a justifi cation of the specifi c decision, including the 
extent to which the Commission reports have been taken into account.65
Th is requirement, which goes beyond the FATF Recommendations, was deemed as 
necessary since national laws had already addressed the broader risks associated with 
other forms of gambling.66 Consequently, from the point of view of the Commission, 
the issue at stake was not whether to include the gambling sector as a whole among the 
obliged entities, but rather whether this inclusion would be the rule, signifying that the 
gambling activities would be covered unless in cases of a low risk of money laundering, 
or the exception, entailing that these would be covered only when there is a proven 
higher risk.67
Th e second extension of the scope of the Directive is found in Article 2(1)(e) of the 
fourth AML Directive, according to which persons dealing in goods and who receive 
payment in cash in an amount of € 10,000 or more are also included among the obliged 
64 See also Recital 21 of fourth AML Directive.
65 Th is addition was not included in the Commission proposal.  See Council of the European Union, 
Documents 13215/13, p. 15 and 5786/1/14, 21.2.2014, p. 18. Th e exclusion of gambling services of low 
risk was also favoured by the European Parliament. See European Parliament, Legislative Resolution 
of 11 March 2014 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
fi nancing (COM(2013)0045)-C7–0032/2013–2013/0025(COD), as found in Council Document 7387/14, 
13.3.2014, p. 30.
66 For example, see Annex IX attached to the Impact Assessment illustrating the diff erent coverage 
of national laws in relation to casinos and the gambling sector. Commission Impact Assessment 
accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for 
the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the proposal for a Regulation on 
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entities.68 As with gambling activities, the fourth AML Directive is a step ahead of 
the FATF Recommendations that set the threshold at € 15,000. Th e rationale was once 
again found in that a number of Member States had taken a stricter approach towards 
the requirement for traders to conduct customer due diligence either by applying 
identifi cation requirements at a lower threshold or by imposing an outright ban on 
payments in cash above certain thresholds.69 Due to this diversity of thresholds, the 
Commission has received complaints that the proceeds of robberies and theft s committed 
in one Member State can be anonymously converted into cash in another Member State 
without the requirement to identify the customer if the amount of the transaction is less 
than € 15,000.70
B. PREVENTION: STRENGTHENING THE RISK-BASED APPROACH
Th ere are three dimensions of risk-assessment and risk-management in the fourth 
AML Directive: the national dimension; the European Union (European Commission) 
dimension; and the private sector dimension. Regarding the national dimension, 
the fourth AML Directive places Member States under the obligation to ensure, in 
accordance with the risk-based approach, that its scope is extended in whole or in part to 
professions and to categories of undertakings, other than the obliged entities referred to 
in its Article 2(1), which engage in activities that are particularly likely to be used for the 
purposes of money laundering or terrorist fi nancing.71 In addition to the obligation to 
widen the ratione personae scope of the fourth AML Directive following the risk-based 
approach (which may result in considerable discrepancies in the coverage of various 
professions from Member State to Member State), Article 7 of the fourth AML Directive 
places a duty on Member States to identify, assess, understand and mitigate the risks of 
money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, including any data protection concerns by 
having in place a mechanism or authority that would organize the national response to 
the risks identifi ed. Information would be extracted by the Commission reports.
In terms of the Union dimension of risk assessment, according to Article 6 of the 
fourth AML Directive, the Commission is entrusted with the task of assessing the risks 
of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing aff ecting the internal market and relating 
to cross border activities. Furthermore, with a view to protecting the proper functioning 
of the internal market, it is an obligation to identify high-risk countries, in terms of 
68 It is noteworthy that the Commission proposal stipulated a threshold that was even lower, that is 
€ 7,500.
69 For an overview of national practices see Commission, Final Study on the application of the Anti-
Money Laundering Directive (conducted by Deloitte, December 2010), p. 74–78.
70 Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the 
use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the 
proposal for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, SWD(2013) 21 fi nal, p. 27.
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countries that have strategic defi ciencies in their domestic anti-money laundering 
and counter-terrorism framework. Th e Commission’s ‘internal’ risk assessment tasks 
in relation to EU Member States are coupled with parallel ‘external’ risk assessment 
duties. According to Article 9(1) and (2) of the fourth AML Directive, the Commission 
must identify third-country jurisdictions which have strategic defi ciencies in their 
national anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist fi nance regimes that pose 
signifi cant threats to the fi nancial system of the Union (‘high-risk third countries’) in 
order to protect the proper functioning of the internal market. Th e recent Commission 
Communication on terrorist fi nancing states that the Commission will accelerate its 
work under the fourth AML Directive to provide for the identifi cation of third countries 
with strategic defi ciencies in the area of anti-money laundering or countering terrorist 
fi nancing.72
In terms of the private sector dimension of risk assessment, the fourth AML Directive 
places Member States under the duty to ensure that obliged entities take appropriate steps 
to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, taking into 
account risk factors including those relating to their customers, countries or geographic 
areas, products, services, transactions or delivery channels.73 Th ey must also ensure that 
obliged entities have in place policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage 
eff ectively the risks of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing identifi ed at the level of 
the Union, the Member State and the obliged entity.74 In both cases, the measures taken 
must be proportionate to the nature and size of the obliged entities.
Furthermore, in relation to simplifi ed due diligence measures, the third AML 
Directive provided for exceptions in cases when the customers were credit or fi nancial 
institutions. Member States could allow professionals to disapply the measures to 
companies ‘listed on a regulated market’ within the scope of Directive 2004/39/
EC,75 domestic public authorities, and other customers who represent a low risk of 
engaging in money laundering or terrorist fi nancing. In addition, customers who 
are public authorities or bodies could benefi t from simplifi ed due diligence under 
specifi c conditions.76 Articles  15 and 16 of the fourth AML Directive stipulate far 
stricter rules by abolishing any of the aforementioned automatic entitlements. 
Instead, decisions on whether to apply simplifi ed due diligence would be based on 
the low risk characterizing transactions or customer relationships. Th e European 
Supervisory Authorities will adopt guidelines as to the risk factors to be taken into 
72 European Commission, Communication on an Action Plan for strengthening the fi ght against terrorist 
fi nancing, COM(2016) 50/2, p. 4.
73 Article 8(1) of fourth AML Directive.
74 Article 8(3) of fourth AML Directive.
75 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in 
fi nancial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, [2004] 
OJ L 145/1.
76 Article 11 of the third AML Directive.
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consideration and the measures to be taken under such circumstances by the end of 
the implementation period.77
C. THE TARGETS OF MONITORING: POLITICALLY-EXPOSED 
PERSONS
In an attempt to strengthen the preventive side of the fourth AML Directive, the defi nition 
and treatment of politically exposed persons (PEPs) as potentially risky individuals has 
undergone signifi cant change. Th e third AML Directive defi ned PEPs as the ‘natural 
persons who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions and immediate 
family members, or persons known to be close associates, of such persons’,78 while that 
Directive required enhanced due diligence measures in relation to those residing in 
another Member Stare or in a third country.79 Similarly, the 2012 FATF Recommendations 
made a distinction between foreign and domestic PEPs and provided examples of specifi c 
positions they may hold in order to fall under each category. Furthermore, risk-based 
requirements for domestic PEPs were introduced, so that obliged entities would be under 
diff erent levels of obligation in respect of foreign and domestic PEPs.
Th e fourth AML Directive departs signifi cantly from the FATF approach and goes 
beyond the international standards and the existing rules; not only does it drop the 
diff erentiation between foreign and domestic PEPs, but also it lists the specifi c posts that 
an individual may hold in order to qualify as a PEP in an exhaustive manner.80 Similarly, 
clarifi cations are provided in relation to the terms ‘family members’ and ‘persons 
known to be close associates’ which cannot be found in the FATF Recommendations.81 
More importantly, the fourth AML Directive prescribes that enhanced due diligence is 
required for all types of PEPs irrespective of whether they are foreign or domestic.82 In the 
Commission’s own words, ‘this option would give greater clarity and more consistency 
to the provisions, while placing the EU ahead of the international standard’.83 Th erefore, 
instead of a graduated approach, whereby obliged entities would have to assess the 
risks that domestic PEPs pose on the basis of risk sensitive elements,84 the EU legislator 
77 Article 17 of third AML Directive.
78 Article 3(8) of third AML Directive.
79 Recital 25 and Article 13(4) of third AML Directive.
80 See Article 3(9) of fourth AML Directive.
81 According to Article 3(10) of the fourth AML Directive family members include the spouse, children 
and their spouses and the parents of PEPs.
82 Article 20 of fourth AML Directive.
83 Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the 
use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the 
proposal for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, SWD(2013) 21 fi nal, p. 42.
84 Th is approach may create some confusion to obliged entities, which would need to apply diff erent 
standards to diff erence categories of PEPs. Instead, the Commission approach will come at a higher 
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opted for treating PEPs in their entirety as automatically high-risk individuals to which 
enhanced due diligence should apply. Th is development is a welcome step as national 
offi  cials and those appointed by international organizations may be used by money 
launderers given their prominent status.
D. THE TARGETS OF MONITORING: BENEFICIAL OWNERS AND 
THE CHALLENGES TO DATA PROTECTION
Th e anti-money laundering preventive framework involves scrutiny of fi nancial 
transactions in the context of customers’ fi nancial or credit institutions as well as other 
categories of a wide range of other service providers. Such operations necessarily involve 
processing, including the collection, retention and further transfer of an abundant 
amount of personal data of customers, which could potentially be used in investigations 
by law enforcement authorities. As such, the procedures of customer due diligence 
constitute an interference with the right to privacy and data protection, thus necessitating 
strict data protection requirements. Before the adoption of the fourth AML Directive, 
the inclusion of data protection rules was not a matter of concern in the prevention of 
money laundering and terrorism fi nancing.
In a welcome step towards transparency and the protection of fundamental rights, 
the fourth AML Directive prescribes numerous data protection safeguards. Th ese 
safeguards were deemed necessary to accompany a key innovation of the fourth AML 
Directive, namely the obligation placed upon Member States to ensure that benefi cial 
ownership information is held in a central register in each Member State, for example 
a commercial register, companies register, or a public register.85 Th e central register 
must ensure timely and unrestricted access by competent authorities and FIUs, without 
alerting the entity concerned and also allow timely access by obliged entities when taking 
customer due diligence measures.86
In particular Recital 14 of the fourth AML Directive stipulates that obliged entities 
must obtain and hold ‘adequate, accurate and current information on their benefi cial 
ownership, in addition to basic information such as the company name and address and 
proof of incorporation and legal ownership’. Benefi cial owners are natural persons who 
ultimately hold or control the customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a 
transaction or activity is being conducted. Th ese references point to the direction of the 
data minimization and data quality principles without being accompanied by a specifi c 
list of the documents and data that would be adequate for the purpose of the fourth AML 
Directive. Furthermore, this information should be centrally stored in a register located 
outside the company but within each Member State.
85 Article 30(3) of fourth AML Directive.
86 Article 30(6) of fourth AML Directive.
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In order to address the divided views of Member States on the storage of data so that it 
can be accessed in a timely manner, the fourth AML Directive allows for ample fl exibility 
in selecting and/or establishing appropriate mechanisms which ensure unrestricted 
access.87 Th erefore, Member States may use a central database specifi cally set up for 
storing benefi cial ownership information, or the business register or another central 
register. Th ey may also require obliged entities to fi ll in the register and they should 
make sure that information is available to competent authorities, FIUs or obliged entities 
when the latter take customer due diligence measures. In addition, other persons who 
are able to demonstrate a legitimate interest are granted access to the data.88 While full 
public access is not explicitly foreseen, however, this may take root at the national level 
since Recital 15 of the fourth AML Directive allows Member States signifi cant leeway to 
provide for conditions of access that are wider than the provisions of the fourth AML 
Directive, thus potentially leading to divergent implementation at the national level.89 
However, Article 30(9) of the fourth AML Directive prescribes that Member States may 
refuse access to obliged entities or third parties exceptionally and on a case-by-case basis 
where such access would expose the benefi cial owner to the risk of fraud, kidnapping, 
blackmail, violence or intimidation or where the owner is a minor or otherwise incapable.
Recital 43 and Article 41(2) of the fourth AML Directive include a direct reference 
to the purpose limitation principle according to which the processing of personal data 
should be permitted only for the purposes of the Directive.90 In addition, the collection 
and further processing of the data should be limited to what is strictly necessary and 
data should not be further processed in a way that is incompatible with that purpose. 
Processing for commercial purposes in particular is strictly prohibited.
Moreover, the retention period of the data appears to be a particularly problematic 
aspect of the fourth AML Directive. In particular, Recital 44 and Article 40 of the fourth 
AML Directive provide that obliged entities should maintain the information acquired 
through due diligence measures as well as records of the transactions for at least fi ve 
years aft er the end of the business relationship with their customer or aft er the date of 
an occasional transaction. Th e retention period, however, may be extended by Member 
87 Austria in particular favoured a central register and fully public access. See Council of the European 
Union, Document 10973/14, 13.6.2014, p. 2. See also the reservations by Estonia, Council Document 
10973/14 ADD 1, 19.6.2014, p. 1.
88 Council, Document 16775/13, p. 4.
89 Th e FATF Guidance on benefi cial ownership of October 2014 stipulated that such information may be 
publicly accessible, but recognizes that this may raise and needs to be balanced with privacy concerns. 
Fully public access was also favoured by the Parliament so that any citizen could access the information 
of any company in any country. Th is approach was preferred with a view to contributing to the fi ght 
against tax evasion, which however is not included among the objectives of the Directive and would 
signify a signifi cant function creep. However, such an approach was deemed by a large majority of 
Member States as disproportionate. See Council of the European Union, Document 16221/14, 2.12.2014, 
p. 2–4.
90 It is noteworthy that the Directive enumerates (albeit in a non-exhaustive manner) diff erent activities 
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States for an additional fi ve years aft er a thorough assessment of the necessity and 
proportionality of such further retention and consider it to be justifi ed as necessary for 
the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering or terrorist fi nancing.
Finally, such rules are without prejudice to the national criminal law on evidence 
applicable to ongoing criminal investigations and legal proceedings. Th e aforementioned 
rules raise grave proportionality concerns. While a retention period of fi ve years may 
seem reasonable (although it would have been welcomed if specifi c arguments had 
been provided), the possible extension of another fi ve years gives Member States a large 
amount of leeway. It would have been preferable if the fourth AML Directive provided 
for a possible extension of the retention period aft er a careful assessment on a case-
by-case basis, as the EDPS had suggested,91 or at least for specifi c guidelines as to the 
circumstances under which such an extension would be necessary.
Finally, Article 41(3) of the fourth AML Directive refers to the right of information 
of the individuals concerned providing that prior to the establishment of a business 
relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction they must be informed about the 
legal obligation under which obliged entities are. While this is a welcome provision, it 
is uncertain whether a customer would understand the purpose for which the personal 
data were collected and retained, in particular whether they would be processed for 
commercial purposes as well. Th e right to access to the data is even more worrying. 
According to Article 41(4) of the fourth AML Directive Member States are allowed to 
restrict it in order to enable the obliged entity or competent national authority to properly 
fulfi l its tasks or to avoid obstructing offi  cial or legal inquiries, analyses, investigations or 
procedures set out in the Directive. As with other provisions on data protection, it leaves 
wide discretion to Member States to determine the cases in which a person may not have 
access to their information.
Th e right of access prescribed not only in the Data Protection Directive92 but also 
in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter)93 and any 
limitation must be strictly interpreted. Th e EU legislator should have at least provided 
some guidelines as to when such limitation would be necessary and proportionate. Also, 
it should have mentioned that this limitation should be used on an exceptional basis. In 
this regard, it is noteworthy that the Parliament had allowed some latitude in its report, 
91 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on a proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the 
purpose of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, and a proposal for a Regulation of the European
 Parliament and of the Council on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds, 4.7.2013, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/
Opinions/2013/13–07–04_Money_laundering_EN.pdf, p. 14.
92 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
[1995] OJ L 281/31.
93 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2012] OJ C 326/391.
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suggesting that if access is denied by an obliged entity or competent authority, the data 
subject could have the right to request via the national data protection authority any 
verifi cations of, access and corrections to or erasure of his or her personal data, as well as 
the right to lodge a judicial procedure.94
Overall, the data protection rules as formulated in the fi nal text are a signifi cant step 
forward in comparison to the previous regime. However, a number of issues are left  to 
the discretion of the Member States allowing a great amount of leeway for diverging 
practices and raising proportionality issues. A fi nal note on the data protection provisions 
of the fourth AML Directive: according to Article 43 of that Directive, the processing 
of personal data is considered ‘a matter of public interest’ under the Data Protection 
Directive. Th e extent to which this must be the relevant ground for data processing is 
doubtful. It appears that a more relevant ground might be the requirement to comply 
with a legal obligation by the obliged entities, competent authorities and FIUs.95
§5. THE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ASPECT: ELABORATING 
THE RULES ON THE OPERATION OF FINANCIAL 
INTELLIGENCE UNITS AND THEIR COOPERATION
A question which is oft en left  relatively unexplored in the evolution of the global and 
EU anti-money laundering regime is what happens to personal and fi nancial data (in 
particular suspicious transaction reports) once they have left  the private sector entities 
who are under the obligation to report. Data supplied by the private sector under anti-
money laundering law reaches organizations which are called fi nancial intelligence 
units. Th us far, EU law has regulated FIUs in a manner of brevity, with few general 
provisions in the AML Directives and a third pillar Decision on FIU co-operation.96 
Importantly, EU law has not imposed upon Member States a specifi c model of FIUs. 
Hence FIUs have developed organically at national level and have taken many diff erent 
forms, which can be categorized broadly into four models: police FIUs, administrative 
FIUs, judicial FIUs and independent FIUs.97 Th ese diff erences in national models of 
94 European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering and 
terrorist fi nancing, A7–0150–2014, p. 69.
95 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on a proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the 
purpose of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, and a proposal for a Regulation of the European
 Parliament and of the Council on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds, 4.7.2013, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/
Opinions/2013/13–07–04_Money_laundering_EN.pdf, p. 8.
96 Council Decision of 17  October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between fi nancial 
intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information, [2000] OJ L 271/4.
97 For an early such categorization, see V. Mitsilegas, ‘New Forms of Transnational Policing: Th e 
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FIUs can be explained by eff orts by Member States to accommodate the new preventive 
anti-money laundering framework within their legal and fi nancial systems. In 
particular, the placement of FIUs outside the criminal justice sector (preferred in the 
majority of EU Member States), refl ects the view that suspicious transaction reports – 
which are transferred by the private sector to be fi ltered by FIUs – are not necessarily 
relevant to criminal proceedings. Hence, keeping reports outside the criminal justice 
system initially will help safeguard the privacy of aff ected individuals while creating 
trust in the system between the regulated and the regulators. Th is focus towards 
independence is also refl ected in the concessions off ered by the AML Directives to legal 
professionals, with Member States as mentioned above having the option of designating 
other regulatory bodies (such as bar associations) as recipients of suspicious transaction 
reports by lawyers.
Th e fourth AML Directive introduces a number of changes to this framework via 
a series of detailed provisions. One of the key objectives behind the revision of the EU 
money laundering framework was to enhance the powers of FIUs, particularly with 
regard to the cross-border cooperation between them.98 Until then, such cooperation was 
addressed by Council Decision 2000/624/JHA99 which concerned arrangements between 
national FIUs in respect of exchanging information. Th e third AML Directive merely 
stated that coordination and cooperation between FIUs, including the establishment of 
an EU FIU-net, should be encouraged to the greatest possible extent and for that purpose 
the Commission would provide assistance.100 In this context, the proposal aimed at 
introducing new provisions regarding FIU powers and cooperation, including an explicit 
legal basis for the matching of anonymous data between the FIUs and clarifying the 
circumstances under which exchange of information could take place.101 It was admitted 
that while these amendments would not solve all existing diffi  culties in the exchange of 
Rights – Part 1’, 3 Journal of Money Laundering Control (1999), p. 147–160; V. Mitsilegas, ‘New Forms 
of Transnational Policing: Th e Emergence of Financial Intelligence Units in the European Union and 
the Challenges for Human Rights – Part 2’, 3 Journal of Money Laundering Control (2000), p. 250–259. 
A more recent analysis confi rms the substance of this categorization: I. Deleanu, ‘FIUs in the European 
Union- facts and fi gures, functions and facilities’, in B. Unger et al.  (eds.), Th e Economic and Legal 
Eff ectiveness of the European Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Policy (Edward Elgar, 2014), p. 97–124.
98 Th is was necessary for two reasons; fi rst, to streamline EU legislation with the FATF Recommendations; 
and secondly, to expressly include terrorist fi nancing within the scope of FIU action. See Commission 
Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the 
fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the proposal 
for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, SWD(2013) 21 fi nal, p. 110–111.
99 Council Decision 2000/642/JHA of 17  October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation 
between fi nancial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information, [2000] 
OJ L 271/4.
100 Recital 40 and Article 38 of the third AML Directive.
101 Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the 
use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the 
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information domain, they would enhance both legal clarity and the eff ectiveness of the 
fi ght against money laundering and fi nancing terrorism.102
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF FIUS
Th e fourth AML Directive calls for the setting up of ‘operationally independent and 
autonomous FIUs’ at the national level to collect and analyse the information that 
they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and 
underlying criminal activity so as to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorism 
fi nancing.103 Recital 37 of the fourth AML Directive (replicated in Article 32(3) of the 
fourth AML Directive) explains that an operationally independent and autonomous FIU 
is understood as the unit that ‘has the authority and capacity to carry out its functions 
freely, including the autonomous decision to analyse, request and disseminate specifi c 
information’.104 Th e fourth AML Directive requires that suspicious transactions and 
other information regarding money laundering should be reported to the FIU, which 
should serve as a central national unit for receiving, analysing and disseminating to the 
competent authorities the results of its analyses.105 In fact, it is made clear that the duty 
to report is not dependent on the amount of the transaction.106
Moreover, Article  21 of the third AML Directive, referring to the powers and 
tasks of FIUs has undergone certain modifi cations. In particular, Article  32(4) of the 
fourth AML Directive prescribes that FIUs shall be able to respond to requests for 
information by competent authorities in their respective states, when such requests 
are triggered by concerns relating to money laundering, associate predicate off ences or 
terrorist fi nancing.107 Th e decision of whether to conduct the analysis or dissemination 
of information remains with the unit.108 However, the EU legislator added two 
102 Alternatively, the Commission envisaged the establishment of a single European FIU entrusted with 
the reception, analysis and dissemination to the competent authorities of the information obtained 
from obliged entities. Such a system would stumble upon national objections concerning sovereignty. 
See ibid.
103 Recital 37 and Article 32(3) of fourth AML Directive. It is noteworthy that the proposal did not contain 
a reference to the need that the FIUs are operationally independent and autonomous. Compare Recital 
25 and Article 31(3) of the proposal (Commission Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of 
the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing, COM(2013) 45 
fi nal). Th e addition in Recital 37 of fourth AML Directive that a FIU should operationally independent 
and autonomous was proposed by the Council. See Council Document 13215/13, p. 8.
104 Th e defi nition of what an operationally independent and autonomous FIU means was inserted at a later 
stage. See Council of the European Union, Document 10970/14 (General approach), 13.6.14, p. 9.
105 Recital 37 of fourth AML Directive.
106 Th is clarifi cation was not included in the Commission proposal. See Council of the European Union, 
Document 16775/13, 22.11.13, p. 8.
107 Compare with Article 31(4) of the proposal (Commission Proposal for a Directive on the prevention 
of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing, 
COM(2013) 45 fi nal) which referred to ‘law enforcement authorities’.
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circumstances under which FIUs will not be obliged to comply with the request for 
information: a) where there are objective grounds for assuming that the provision of 
such information would have a negative eff ect on ongoing investigations or analyses, or, 
b) in exceptional circumstances, where disclosure of the information would be clearly 
disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or irrelevant with 
regard to the purposes for which it has been requested. Another addition is that FIUs 
are required to provide feedback as how they made use of the information provided and 
about the outcome of the investigations or inspections performed on the basis of that 
information.109 Th us, elements of transparency and accountability are inserted in the 
FIUs powers.
Furthermore, FIUs are empowered to take urgent action directly or indirectly, 
where there is a suspicion that a transaction is related to money laundering or terrorist 
fi nancing, to suspend or withhold consent to a transaction that is proceeding, in order to 
analyse the transaction, confi rm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analysis 
to the competent authorities.110 In this regard, the Council added that the FIU shall be 
able to take such action even when that was requested by an FIU established in another 
Member State on the basis of the national law of the FIU receiving the request.111
In addition, a new rule regarding the analysis function of the FIU is introduced. 
Th is function will consist of an operational analysis which focuses on individual cases 
and specifi c targets or on appropriate selected information, depending on the type 
and volume of the disclosures received and the expected use of the information aft er 
dissemination and of a strategic analysis addressing money laundering and terrorism 
fi nancing trends and patterns.112 Finally, minor additions have been inserted in 
Article  22 of the third AML Directive concerning the duties of obliged entities with 
regard to FIUs. First, obliged entities are mandated to inform the FIU about suspicious 
transactions including by fi ling a report and in such cases there is an explicit duty to 
promptly respond to requests by the FIU for additional information.113
B. COOPERATION BETWEEN FIUs
Th e improvement of exchange of information between FIUs across the EU is placed high 
in the hierarchy of measures to address money laundering and terrorist fi nancing. In 
this context, special reference is made to the decentralized computer network FIU.et or 
its successor and the techniques off ered by it.114 Furthermore, Recital 55 of the fourth 
109 Article  32(6) of fourth AML Directive. Th is requirement was inserted by the Council. See Council 
Document 13215/13, p. 37.
110 Article 32(7) of fourth AML Directive.
111 Council, Document 13215/13, p. 38.
112 Article 32(8) of fourth AML Directive.
113 Article 33 of fourth AML Directive. Emphasis added.
114 Recital 56 of fourth AML Directive.
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AML Directive highlights the role of the EU Financial Intelligence Unit Platform (EU 
FIUs Platform), an informal group composed of representatives from FIUs, which has 
been active since 2006.115 Moreover, in the light of the extension of predicate off ences to 
include tax crimes, it is clarifi ed that the exchange of information on cases concerning 
tax crimes should be without prejudice to the exchange of information taking place on 
the basis of Directive 2011/16/EU or in accordance with international rules concerning 
tax matters.116 Finally, Recital 58 is a new addition to the fourth AML Directive in 
comparison to the Proposal and sets out certain basic rules as to how FIUs’ cooperation 
should take place: in particular, Member States should encourage their competent 
authorities to provide (rapidly, constructively and eff ectively) the widest range of cross-
border cooperation for the purposes of the fourth AML Directive. More importantly, 
the fourth AML Directive mandates free, spontaneous or upon request, information 
exchange between FIUs established in the EU and third-country fi nancial intelligence 
units, having regard to EU law and to the principles relating to information exchange as 
developed by the Egmont Group of FIUs.117
Moving to the core of the Directive, Article 51 of the fourth AML Directive refers to 
the role of the Commission within the FIU cooperation framework. In order to facilitate 
coordination, including information exchange, the Commission is enabled to convene 
regular meetings of the EU FIU’s platform composed of representatives from Member 
States’ FIUs. Th e addition of this article in comparison to the previous regime lies in the 
extensive references to the work of the platform, as also highlighted in Recital 55 of the 
fourth AML Directive. It is mentioned in this regard that it may facilitate cooperation 
among FIUs, exchange views and provide advice on implementation issues relevant for 
FIUs and reporting entities as well as on cooperation-related issues such as: eff ective FIU 
cooperation; the identifi cation of suspicious transactions with a cross-border dimension; 
the standardization of reporting formats through the FIU.net platform or its successor; 
the joint analysis of cross-border cases and the identifi cation of trends and factors 
relevant to assessing the risks of money laundering; and terrorist fi nancing at national 
and supranational level.118
As regards the coordination between FIUs as such, it needs to be stressed at the outset 
that the fourth AML Directive requires Member States to ensure that FIUs cooperate 
with each other ‘to the greatest extent possible’ irrespective of the model they have chosen 
for their organization.119 Overall, the EU rules regarding exchange of information are 
highly favourable towards information exchange and provide very limited restrictions 
115 Th is Recital was added in Council Document 13215/13, p. 19.
116 Recital 56 of fourth AML Directive.
117 To a large extent this recital was added by the Council. See Council Document 16775/13, p. 12.
118 Ibid., p. 56.
119 Article 52 of fourth AML Directive. In this regard, the European Parliament had suggested specifi c 
reference to the need to ensure compliance with data protection rules. See Council of the European 
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in this regard. In particular, according to Article  53(1) of the fourth AML Directive, 
FIUs are empowered to exchange, spontaneously or upon request, any information 
that may be relevant for the processing or analysis of information by the FIU related to 
money laundering or terrorist fi nancing, ‘even if the type of predicate off ence that may 
be at stake is not identifi ed at the time of the exchange’.120 In terms of the procedure, 
Article 53(1) of the fourth AML Directive further sets out the necessary elements that a 
request for information exchange should contain, namely the relevant facts, background 
information, reasons for the request and how the information sought will be used. In 
order to ensure extensive cooperation, diff erent exchange mechanisms may be used if 
so agreed between the FIUs, in particular as regards exchanges through the FIU.net 
platform or its successor.121 Besides, in cases when a report concerns another Member 
State, then the FIU must promptly forward it to the FIU of that Member State.122
Th e permissive approach of the Directive as regards cooperation between FIUs is 
further attested in Article 53(2) of the fourth AML Directive, according to which FIUs 
must be able to use the whole range of their available powers that they would normally 
use domestically for receiving and analysing information when it applies to a request 
for information from another FIU. Th en the request should be replied to in a timely 
manner and if a FIU requests additional information from an obliged entity established 
in another Member State which operates on its territory, the request should be addressed 
to the FIU of the Member States in whose territory the obliged entity is established.123
Perhaps the most notable example of the wide possibilities for information 
exchange off ered by the Directive can be found in Article  53(3) of the fourth AML 
Directive. Th e latter prescribes the conditions under which a FIU may refuse to 
disclose information on the basis of a request. In principle, it must be stressed that, as 
Recital 56 of the fourth AML Directive suggests, requests for exchange of information 
should normally be approved.124 It is only in exceptional circumstances where the 
exchange of information could be contrary to fundamental principles of its national 
law that the requested FIU may refuse to exchange information.125 In order to ensure 
this practically free and unlimited information exchange between FIUs, the fourth 
AML Directive further requires Member States to formulate those exceptions in a way 
which prevents misuse of, and undue limitation on, the free exchange of information 
for analytical purposes.
120 Th is last part of this sentence was added by the Council. See Council Document 16775/13, p. 56.
121 Th e inclusion of this sentence was suggested by the Council. See Council Document 13215/13, p. 49.
122 Ibid.
123 Th e inclusion of this rule was at the behest of the European Parliament. See Council Document 7387/14, 
p. 68–69.
124 In Recital 56 of fourth AML Directive it is stated that ‘the initial exchange of information between 
FIUs relating to money laundering or terrorist fi nancing for analytical purposes which is not further 
processed or disseminated should be permitted unless such exchange of information would be contrary 
to fundamental principles of national law’.
125 Article 53(3) of fourth AML Directive.
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In this regard it is noteworthy that in comparison with the Commission proposal, 
this provision was signifi cantly watered down by Council during negotiations.126 In 
particular, the Commission envisaged far stricter conditions for refusal to exchange 
information either: a) when divulging information would lead to impairment of 
a criminal investigation being conducted in the requested Member State; or b) in 
exceptional circumstances, understood as where divulgation of information would be 
clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person of the 
Member State or irrelevant to the purposes for which it has been collected. In addition, 
the proposal noted that any such refusal must have been appropriately justifi ed to the 
FIU requesting the information.127 In practice, the Commission proposal mirrored 
the conditions under which the FIU would be under no obligation to comply with a 
request for information by the competent national authorities. However, in the light of 
the fi nal text, the fourth AML Directive creates an interesting paradox; information 
exchange between FIUs is subject to more lenient conditions than in cases where FIUs 
have to respond to requests for information by the competent authorities at the national 
level. More importantly the term ‘fundamental principles of national law’ is not further 
elaborated, is particularly vague and may result in divergent interpretations during 
implementation at the national level.
Moreover, Article  54 of the fourth AML Directive provides rules concerning the 
aft ermath of information exchange. In this regard, it is stated that when exchanging 
information and documents, the transmitting FIU may impose restrictions and 
conditions for the use of that information, with which the receiving FIU must comply. In 
addition, it is explicitly pointed out that the exchanged information must be used only 
for the purpose for which it was sought or provided, thus making a direct reference to 
the purpose limitation principle.128 As for dissemination of information by the receiving 
FIU to any other authority, agency or department, or any use of information for purposes 
beyond the ones for which exchange of information was originally approved, it is subject 
to the consent of the FIU providing the information. Th e Commission proposal, which 
referred to the ‘approval’ by the requested FIU rather than its ‘consent’,129 included no 
further guidelines as regards the conditions under which such consent would be provided 
and the EDPS was overall satisfi ed with the provision.130
126 See Council Document 16775/13, p. 57.
127 Article 50(3) of the proposal (Commission Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the 
fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing, COM(2013) 45 fi nal).
128 Article 55(1) of fourth AML Directive. Th e reference to the purpose limitation principle was added by 
the Council. See Council Document 16775/13, p. 57.
129 Article  51 of the proposal (Commission Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the 
fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing, COM(2013) 45 fi nal).
130 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on a proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the 
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However, during the negotiations, Article  55 of the fourth AML Directive was 
expanded to further circumscribe the conditions under which the requested FIU would 
not provide its consent. As with cooperation between FIUs in general, the EU legislator 
envisages dissemination of information ‘to the largest extent possible’. In this framework, 
the only circumstances under which a requested FIU is allowed to refuse providing its 
consent for further dissemination, which must be appropriate explained when applicable, 
are the following: a) where this would fall beyond the scope of its anti-money laundering 
and terrorist fi nance provisions; b) where it could lead to an impairment of a criminal 
investigation; c) where it would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests 
of a natural or legal person or the Member State of the requested FIU; or d) where it 
would otherwise not be in accordance with fundamental principles of national law of 
that Member State.131
In addition, the fourth AML Directive mandates Member States to require their 
FIUs to use protected channels of communication between themselves and encourage 
the use of the FIU.net platform or its successor.132 Besides, FIUs must cooperate by 
applying state-of-the-art technologies pursuant to national law. Th ese technologies will 
enable FIUs to match their data with other FIUs in an anonymous way by ensuring the 
full protection of personal data with the aim to detect subjects of the FIU’s interests in 
other Member States and identify their proceeds and funds. However, the EDPS had 
recommended that the retention period of the data exchange is defi ned and limited to 
what is strictly necessary in relation to the purpose of the processing, that data should 
be updated by designating agents responsible for this task inside the FIU and that rules 
should be inserted to ensure the security of data.133
C. CHALLENGES FOR PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION
Th e aforementioned rules regarding the cooperation between FIUs pose signifi cant 
challenges concerning the protection of fundamental rights, in particular privacy and 
data protection, of the individuals whose data is processed. Worryingly, the fourth 
 Parliament and of the Council on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds, 4.7.2013, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/
Opinions/2013/13–07–04_Money_laundering_EN.pdf, p. 22.
131 Article 55(2) of fourth AML Directive. Added by Council Document 16775/13, p. 58.
132 Compare Article  53(1) of the proposal (Commission Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of 
the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing, 
COM(2013) 45 fi nal), which uses less strong language by requiring Member States to ‘encourage their 
FIUs to use protected channels of communication’.
133 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on a proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the 
purpose of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, and a proposal for a Regulation of the European
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AML Directive mandates the almost unlimited exchange of information on suspicious 
transactions irrespective of the organizational nature of the FIU, an issue that has always 
been left  to the discretion of Member States.134
First of all, this fl exibility as regards the structure of national FIUs and consequently 
their relationship with the police and judicial authorities signifi es that the applicable 
data protection framework is debatable. An illustration of the problem would be in cases 
when the requesting FIU is a police authority and the requested is an administrative 
one. According to Recital 37 of the fourth AML Directive, the purpose of FIUs is ‘to 
collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links 
between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent 
and combat money laundering and terrorist fi nancing’. Th erefore, the purpose of FIUs 
is directly related to the prevention and fi ght of specifi c crimes and as such it should fall 
within the Article 3(2) exception of the Data Protection Directive, according to which 
the latter does not apply ‘to processing operations concerning public security defence, 
State security (…) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law’.
Th is exception triggers the application of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on 
exchange of information in criminal matters, soon to be replaced by a directive on the 
processing of data for criminal law purposes.135 Given the function of FIUs as fi ltering 
information before this could be further disseminated to law enforcement authorities 
if necessary, this direction may seem more appropriate. However, this solution is not as 
straightforward as it may seem: for instance, the EDPS had called for a clarifi cation that 
FIUs are not considered ‘competent authorities’ within the meaning of Article 87 TFEU. 
In the view of the EDPS, ‘[d]espite the fact that they may have tasks similar to those of law 
enforcement authorities, they should – in the activities covered by the proposed fourth 
AML Directive – not be considered as police or judicial authorities’.136 Th e fact that this 
suggestion was not followed up during the negotiations and the wording of the fi nal text 
according to which the fourth AML Directive ‘is without prejudice to the protection of 
personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, including Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA’, may be seen as further 
indications of the true nature of FIUs as forming part of national law enforcement 
arsenal.
134 For an analysis see V. Mitsilegas, 3 Journal of Money Laundering Control (1999), p. 147–160; and V. 
Mitsilegas, 3 Journal of Money Laundering Control (2000), p. 250–259.
135 Political agreement has been reached in this regard and the most recent version of the Directive can be 
found in Council Document 5463/16, 28.1.2016.
136 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on a proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the 
purpose of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, and a proposal for a Regulation of the European
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Bringing the operation of FIUs into the realm of law enforcement has two 
consequences: fi rst, under the current regime, only the cooperation of FIUs falls within 
the scope of the Framework Decision because the latter does not regulate the processing 
of personal data at the domestic level. Th is leaves the operation of FIUs within the 
national territory outside the remits of special EU rules (only the Charter safeguards 
are applicable in this context). It is aft er the adoption and implementation of the revised 
Data Protection Directive that the processing of data both at the national level and EU 
level will be regulated. Second, the applicability of the Framework Decision signifi es that 
the data protection standards for individuals are heavily watered down in comparison 
to the 1995 Data Protection Directive. Th e most prominent example in this regard is the 
possibility to process exchanged data for purposes other than the ones for which the data 
had originally been collected. According to Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision,
further processing for another purpose shall be permitted in so far as a) it is not incompatible 
with the purposes for which the data were collected; b) the competent authorities are 
authorised to process such data for such other purpose in accordance with the applicable legal 
provisions; and c) processing is necessary and proportionate to that other purpose.
However, even so Article 55(1) of the fourth AML Directive on the possibility to further 
disseminate information obtained from an FIU seems to be particularly problematic in so 
far as it mandates that the requested FIU must grant its consent for further dissemination 
of data from the requesting FIU to another agency, authority or department, to the extent 
possible. First of all, the article does not specify the type of authorities to which the 
information will be disseminated and therefore it is not explicitly stated that these should 
receive information only insofar as they are allowed to process FIUs’ data. Secondly, even 
in cases when the receiving authorities may process FIUs’ information (for example, 
police authorities that further investigate a suspicious transaction), the necessity and 
proportionality condition of the Framework Decision is not adequately respected by the 
fourth AML Directive. Instead of necessity and proportionality assessment being central 
in any decision for further dissemination, the threshold in the fourth AML Directive 
is signifi cantly higher; proportionality is one of the four conditions for refusal to grant 
consent. Besides, it is only when such dissemination is clearly disproportionate to the 
legitimate interests of the person concerned or the Member State of the requested FIU 
that consent shall be refused.
Th ese privacy and data protection concerns are exacerbated by recent calls by the 
European Commission to Member States to improve exchange of fi nancial intelligence 
between EU FIUs and third country FIUs and between FIUs and the private sector, in 
line with FATF Recommendations and best practices.137 Th e Commission notes in this 
context that international standards now emphasize the importance of extending the 
137 European Commission, Communication on an Action Plan for strengthening the fi ght against terrorist 
fi nancing, COM(2016) 50/2, p. 4.
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scope of the access to the information available to FIUs and this will be achieved through 
an amendment of the fourth AML Directive.138 Th is is familiar territory: in the name 
of a renewed threat (in this case terrorism), the Commission calls for a revision of a – in 
this case quite recent – AML Directive in order to implement global (and in particular 
FATF) standards.
However, the transfer of everyday personal data to third countries on a large scale 
without a substantive assessment of the adequacy of their data protection framework 
has been found by the Court of Justice to be contrary to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.139 Moreover, the establishment of further information exchange channels 
between FIUs and the private sector may challenge the principle of purpose limitation 
and exceed the powers allocated to FIUs. A detailed privacy and data protection audit 
must accompany any expansion of EU law in the fi eld, in particular taking into account 
the lack of harmonization in relation to the nature, powers and tasks of FIUs.
§6. CONCLUSION
Th e analysis in this article has painted a picture of a multi-layered, constantly evolving 
and expanding European Union anti-money laundering legal framework. In all four 
main pillars of EU anti-money laundering law, measures have been regularly revised 
and their scope has widened. In the fi eld of criminalization, we have witnessed the 
proliferation of predicate off ences and the confl ation within the anti-money laundering 
framework of the quest to tackle phenomena as disparate as terrorist fi nance and tax 
evasion. In the fi eld of prevention, successive EU directives have expanded the list of 
the professions who are covered by the fourth AML Directive to gradually include non-
fi nancial and non-regulated professions. At the same time rules on the substance of 
preventive duties have been further elaborated to both pay particular attention to certain 
categories of individuals including politically exposed persons and benefi cial owners, 
and to introduce a so-called ‘risk-based approach’ to prevention. In the fi eld of fi nancial 
intelligence, EU law – and in particular the fourth AML Directive – has introduced more 
detailed rules on the operation of fi nancial intelligence units, with their establishment 
however still fi rmly grounded on national law.
Th roughout the evolution of EU anti-money laundering law, the impact of 
globalization on EU action – and in particular of the Recommendations of the FATF – has 
been striking. In all cases mentioned above, EU law has been revised to take into account 
developments in the FATF Recommendations. Th e more these standards develop in this 
manner, however, the more likely it is for the EU legislator to face constitutional and 
fundamental rights objections. Key examples in this context constitute the recent calls 
138 Ibid, p. 7.
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for the expansion of co-operation between fi nancial intelligence units and the extension 
of confi scation powers, which may fall foul of national constitutional provisions, the 
ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Th is landscape demonstrates the limits 
of the normative outcome of a single agenda, technocratic and expert organization such 
as the FATF within the broader European Union constitutional context. Th e tension 
between attempts to extend the fi eld of enforcement in money laundering law, justifi ed 
as responding to FATF Recommendations and security threats on the one hand, and 
upholding constitutional provisions and fundamental rights on the other, is ongoing 
and will not go away. As the Commission’s recent Action Plan on terrorist fi nance has 
demonstrated, anti-money laundering law will always be used in a chameleon manner, 
adjusted to provide ready responses to every security threat arising in the political 
vocabulary.
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